Institutions, social norms, and economic development /
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Amsterdam, the Netherlands :
Harwood Academic Publishers,
©2000.
|
| Series: | Fundamentals of development economics ;
v. 1. |
| Subjects: |
Table of Contents:
- Foreword / Douglass C. North
- 1. The Subject Put into Perspective. Radicalism vs. gradualism: The intellectual debate of the 1950s and 1960s. Marx and Boserup: Institutional development as an induced mechanism. The new institutional economics: A comparative static approach privileging transaction costs and risk considerations. Social norms and fairness considerations. The evolutionary approach to institutions
- 2. Resource Endowments and Agricultural Development. Physical isolation and transportation bottlenecks. Physical isolation and market underdevelopment. Physical isolation and constraints on the supply of public goods. The complicating presence of technology constraints. Lessons from the debate on the aggregate supply response. App. Optimal choice of agricultural policy mix
- 3. Property Rights in Land
- Part I: Dividing the Commons. The view of the property rights school and their evolutionary followers. Limitations of the (qualified) property rights approach
- 4. Property Rights in Land
- Part II: Individualization of Land Tenure. The ETLR (Evolutionary Theory of Land Rights): A presentation. The ETLR put to test: The efficiency effects. The ETLR put to test: The induced demand-and-supply mechanism
- 5. Egalitarian Norms and Economic Growth. Egalitarian norms in a context of resource abundance and pervasive uncertainties. The role of witchcraft as a deterrent to private accumulation of wealth. The adverse consequences of traditional egalitarian norms for economic growth. A game-theoretical perspective. Overcoming or evading social restraints on individual wealth pursuit
- 6. Endogeneity in the Rise of Market Order. The problem of the market order: Lessons from general equilibrium theory. The problem of the market order: Trust-enforcing mechanisms based on reputation effects. The problem of the market order: Lessons from evolutionary game theory
- 7. Market Order, the Rule of Law and Moral Norms. The limitations of self-enforcing equilibria. The rule of law as a necessary complement to spontaneous order. The role of moral norms. Limited morality at work
- 8. No Easy Answer. Evolution of moral norms. Path-dependent trajectories in Europe.