The philosophy of Husserl /
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| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Montreal ; Ithaca [N.Y.] :
McGill-Queen's University Press,
©2010.
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| Series: | Continental European philosophy
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| Subjects: |
Table of Contents:
- Prolegomenon : Husserl's turn to history and pure phenomenology
- [pt.] I. Plato's and Aristotle's theory of eidē. Plato's Socratic theory of eidē : the first pillar of the ancient precedent to pure phenomenology
- Plato's arithmological theory of eidē : the second pillar of the ancient precedent to pure phenomenology
- Aristotle's criticism of Plato's theory of eidē : the third (and final) pillar of the ancient precedent to pure phenomenology
- [pt.] II. From descriptive psychology to transcendentally pure phenomenology. Origin of the task of pure phenomenology
- Pure phenomenology and Platonism
- Pure phenomenology as the transcendental-phenomenological investigation of absolute consciousness
- Transcendental phenomenology of absolute consciousness and phenomenological philosophy
- Limits of the transcendental-phenomenological investigation of pure consciousness
- [pt.] III. From the phenomenology of transcendental consciousness to that of monadological intersubjectivity. Phenomenological philosophy as transcendental idealism
- The intersubjective foundation of transcendental idealism : the immanent transcendency of the world's objectivity
- [pt.] IV. From monadological intersubjectivity to the historical a priori constitutive of all meaning. The pure phenomenological motivation of Husserl's turn to history
- The essential connection between intentional history and actual history
- The historicity of both the intelligibility of ideal meanings and the possibility of actual history
- Desedimentation and the link between intentional history and the constitution of a historical tradition
- Transcendental phenomenology as the only true explanation of objectivity and all meaningful problems in previous philosophy
- [pt.] V. The unwarranted historical presuppositions guiding the fundamental ontological and deconstructive criticisms of transcendental philosophy. The methodological presupposition of the ontico-ontological critique of intentionality : Plato's Socratic seeing of the eidē
- The mereological presupposition of fundamental ontology : that being as a whole has meaning overall
- The presupposition behind the proto-deconstructive critique of intentional historicity : the conflation of intrasubjective and intersubjective idealities
- The presupposition behind the deconstruction of phenomenology : the subordination of being to speech
- Epilogue : transcendental-phenomenological criticism of the criticism of phenomenological cognition
- Coda : phenomenological self-responsibility and the singularity of transcendental philosophy.